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In this article, we review genetic determinism and highlight how our earlier re-
search on the philosophy of place can contribute to a better understanding of 
genomics and ongoing debates about genetic modification. We show how place 
can undermine any philosophy of genetic determinism. By using our philosophy 
of place, our investigation contributes to a call for a turn for humanity toward 
a “collective being-at-home-in-the-world”, instead of being estranged from place 
which genetic determinism actively promotes. We also utilise cinema studies re-
search of the film GATTACA to conceptualise how place and genetic determin-
ism contrast. Our examination is intended to contribute to ongoing discussions 
about genetic determinism as they play out in the media, in education and influ-
ence discrimination. Fundamentally, we show why scholars in this area should 
consider place alongside genetic determinism in their future investigations. 
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Introduction
Throughout this article, we will continue our earlier work (Gildersleeve, 
Crowden, 2018) to demonstrate that insights from place provides deeper and 
more critical analysis of the philosophy of genetic determinism. We introduce 
genetic determinism here by noting that
“There is much evidence now, in a variety of domains such as sexual orienta-
tion, criminality, mental illness, obesity, gender, race, and ethnicity, of causal 
relationships between genetic attributions as explanations of group differences 
and perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors” (Dar-Nimrod and Heine, 2011, p. 
813). 
However, these findings can lead to the belief that “the gene becomes en-
dowed with an almost mystical ability to shape individual and group charac-
teristics, with sociocultural and environmental elements largely being ignored” 
(Ibid) (including place). As a result, there: 
“is concern that health communication about genomics will increase public 
beliefs that genes [directly] determine health (Harris, Weiner, & Parrott, 2005), 
a phenomenon referred to as genetic determinism. A growing body of literature 
from various disciplines has debated the social and ethical meanings of genetic 
determinism, raising questions about how genes define the essence of people’s 
attributes (Biesecker, 1998; Finkler, 2000; Keller, 2005)” (Parrott, Kahl, Ndiaye, 
Traeder, 2012, p. 763). 
Genetic determinism is a problematic philosophy because it “reduces the 
self to a molecular entity, equating human beings, in all their social, historical, 
and moral complexity, with their genes” (Nelkin, Lindee, 2004, p. 2). When 
this occurs, place is foreclosed and this leads to a psychopathological complex 
being formed (Gildersleeve, 2016). As we have argued elsewhere, the aims of 
both Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis are informed by a restoration of 
place. Essentially, what we argue is that the foreclosure of place creates the 
obstructiveness of a complex experience of ‘not-being-at-home-in-the-world’ 
(Gildersleeve, 2017, p. 2). Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis aims to change 
this so the analysand can “’return’ to place-as a homecoming” (Malpas, 2012, 
p. 19). Psychoanalysis allows a broadening of an analysand’s horizon to place in 
this way because place is “a structure that resists any reductive analysis” (Ibid, 
p. 4). Unfortunately, genetic determinism’s distancing from place is in opposi-
tion to these aims of psychoanalysis. When place is not acknowledged indi-
vidual mental health is potentially challenged. Thus, genetic determinism will 
potentially contribute to mental illness through the formation of complexes 
(Gildersleeve, 2017; 2018). 
The Human Genome Project has been described as the search for the “essence 
of life” (Coyne, 1995. p. 80), the ‘Holy Grail’ that would enable the understand-
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ing of humanity” however this “may lead people to conceive of genes as playing 
a deterministic role” (Dar-Nimrod, Heine, 2011, p. 812). This is psychologically 
dangerous because “people are influenced by scientific arguments regarding the 
role of genes in their lives”, more specifically “people’s understanding of genes 
also influences the ways that they live their lives” (Ibid, p. 800). In other words, 
belief in genetic determinism alienates an individual from discovering their 
place in the world and history because it “may lead people to view outcomes 
as immutable and determined. That is, an outcome is perceived to unfold ac-
cording to some fixed set of underlying genetic processes that people assume is 
largely independent of environmental influence and beyond individuals’ con-
trol” (Ibid, p. 802). This is in unmistakable contrast to our philosophy of place, 
which is “a structure that resists any reductive analysis”. Genetic determinism 
is blind to the reality that the effect of genes is “constituted through an es-
sential mutuality of relation at every level” (Malpas, 2012, p. 4). In other words, 
the effect that genes have on an individual is determined “in the way in which 
the multiple elements of place are gathered together in their mutual relatedness 
to one another” (Ibid, p. 18) and therefore resists the reductionism to genes of 
genetic determinism1. The outcome of a gene on an individual’s whole life is not 
determined by genes alone but instead involves an 
“essential gathering of elements in a mutual belonging together in which they 
come to presence that Heidegger also describes as the Ereignis — an event that 
is to be understood not as purely temporal, but as the temporalizing of space 
and the spatializing of time in the single gatheredness of place” (Ibid). 
When place is hidden and forgotten, genetic determinism “leads people to 
view genetically influenced outcomes as inescapable and predestined. If the 
genes are present, the outcome is expected” (Dar-Nimrod, Heine, 2011, p. 802). 
This is problematic because this belief signals, “the ending of history” which 
“is to be found in the nihilism of the almost complete forgetting of being that 
is also a forgetting of place” (Malpas, 2012, p. 35). In this article, we highlight 
more precisely, why the philosophy of genetic determinism is so dangerous be-
cause it is psychologically pathological which leads to formations of complexes 
as an experience of not-being-at-home-in-the-world (Gildersleeve, 2016b). Later 
1 Here we should clarify one possible confusion in our paper. For example, we agree that the sex 
(male or female) of an individual is determined through genes and our article does not disagree 
with that. Instead we wish to illustrate that even though sex is determined by genes it does not 
mean this genetic determinism will determine the destiny or life of that individual as a whole. 
Yes, genes can determine one element or characteristic of an individual (being male or female) 
but this does not completely determine who that person will become or the life experiences 
they will encounter. For example, the historical moment in time and geographical location that 
this individual finds themselves and the other interconnecting elements in the world around 
them will determine their place in the world and the person they will become. This is our non-
reductive view on place which emphasizes a multiplicity of elements which are gathered and 
have a mutual relatedness or reciprocal determination (Gildersleeve, Crowden, 2018, p. 79) to 
allow greater differentiation in contrast to reducing an individual exclusively to their genes. 
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in this paper, we make use of the film GATTACA for elucidating this. We also 
highlight that arguments that criticize genetic modification based on genetic 
determinism are fallible when place is brought into the picture. 
Genetic Determinism, Place and Human Character
The forgetting of place can be described as “the nihilism of modernity” 
(Malpas, 2012, p. 98) and this is how genetic determinism adversely affects 
how people “understand other people as well as themselves” (Dar-Nimrod, He-
ine, 2011, p. 803). Genetic determinism endorses “a denial of the very topos in 
which thinking itself comes to pass” (Malpas, 2012, p. 98). When this occurs, 
place will affect (experienced through the obstructiveness of a complex) an 
individual who denies or covers their place in the world and history with ge-
netic determinism, which “is the belief that human behavior, personality, and 
physical appearance are determined exclusively by a person’s genetic makeup” 
(Kirby, 2000, p. 197). In contrast, our non-reductive philosophy of place clashes 
with this because “Genetic determinism is a reductionist ideology in that it 
seeks to explain a complex whole (a human being) in terms of its component 
parts (individual genes)” (Ibid). 
Supporters of genetic determinism believe “human lives and actions are 
inevitable consequences of the biochemical properties of the cells that make 
up the individual; and these characteristics are in turn uniquely determined 
by the constituents of the genes possessed by each individual” (Ibid). Because 
this belief ignores place (genes interacting and determined by Others see Gild-
ersleeve, Crowden, 2018) it leads an individual to experience an obstructive 
complex (Gildersleeve, 2016b, p. 90) indicative of “Homelessness (…) consists in 
the abandonment of beings by being. Homelessness is the symptom of oblivion 
of being” (Malpas, 2012, p. 154). Place is not considered in this belief because 
“Genetic determinism is the impulse to treat DNA as destiny, discounting the 
possibility of deviating from one’s genetic predisposition” (Rothenberg, Wang, 
2006, p. 356) and the influence of Others. Condit comments on Rothenberg 
and Wang by stating, “the idea that genes constitute a closed destiny arises 
from what they describe as an ‘overemphasis’ on genes” (Condit, 2011, p. 620). 
This overemphasis of genes puts place into darkness and this is an ontological 
problem because “By attributing a trait entirely to genetic factors, a reductive 
and determinist view of behavioural genetics research can also shift blame 
away from environmental factors created by society”. Furthermore, this shifts 
“blame for the behavior away from both individual ‘free will’ and the environ-
ment created by the family, community, and society” (Rothenberg and Wang, 
2006, p. 359). Genetic determinism assumes “that ‘genes’ signaled belief in a 
closed future” and “‘genes’ had such a powerful influence that its mere presence 
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necessarily swamped any consideration of other causal influences” (Condit, 
2011, p. 620). As a result, genetic determinism takes part in the philosophical 
“tradition as having largely overlooked the ‘situatedness’” of place. In contrast, 
the philosophy of place combined with Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis 
(Gildersleeve, Crowden, 2018) offer an individual the opportunity to “find their 
unity not in any single preexisting element [e.g. genes] in that place from which 
the unity of the whole derives, but rather in the way in which the multiple 
elements of the place are gathered together in their mutual relatedness to one 
another” (Malpas, 2012, p. 18). 
Our philosophy of place (combined with Jung and Lacan) opposes the idea 
that “genes invariably determine characters, so that the outcomes are just a 
little, or not at all, affected by changes in the environment or by the differ-
ent environments in which individuals live” (Jamieson, Radick, 2017, p. 1265). 
We believe this because “any place encompasses other places within it while 
also being encompassed by other places in its turn” (Malpas, 2012, p. 49) and 
this is not recognised when an individual is reduced to their genes. An impor-
tant reason why this is problematic is that it can lead to ‘genetic optimism’, 
which is the belief “that increased understanding of genes, and greater ability 
to manipulate them, will be a ‘super solution’, especially in relation to human 
health and medical developments” (Jamieson, Radick, 2017, p. 1266). This op-
timism is misguided because it overlooks the importance of factors such as 
place and without this recognition; an individual will continue to experience 
mental illness through obstructive complexes (Gildersleeve, Crowden, 2018). 
Scott Gilbert (2002) highlights the prevalence and absurdity of this problem 
from supporters of genetic determinism in “current popularizers of biology, 
such as Richard Dawkins (1985), who writes of the genome as the book of life” 
and “Walter Gilbert (1990) envisions each of us owning a CD that we can point 
to and say ‘Here is a human being; it’s me’” (Gilbert, 2002, p. 123). Gilbert also 
brings attention to “Paglia (1992) declaring that DNA is the core of her being, 
‘the hard nugget of the self ’, a genetic gift (…) Biology is our hidden fate” (Ibid). 
Finally, there is “James Watson and others of the Human Genome project who 
claim that understanding the genome will be to find out who we are and to 
finally ‘know ourselves’” (Ibid). All of these opinions are misguided when con-
trasted to the philosophy of place because instead of 
“presenting human beings as deterministically constrained, such a conception 
opens up a view of the human as enmeshed in an essentially reciprocal relation 
with the world in which it is also situated. The human thus cannot be assumed 
in advance, nor can it be taken to arise out of only one set of structures or ele-
ments alone” (Malpas, 2012, p. 156). 
The ideology of genetic determinism contributes to mental illness by claim-
ing, “we are what our genomes tell us to be” and “once we know the sequence of 
the human genome, we will now know how to cure such diseases as homeless-
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ness (Koshland, 1989) and homosexuality (Watson, 1997)” (Gilbert, 2002, p. 
123). This erroneous belief in genetic determinism is disastrous as it can “inhibit 
attempts to engage in preventive health behaviours by engendering a sense of 
fatalism and a belief that such behaviours will be ineffective” (Senior, Marteau, 
Weinman, 2000, p. 1086). For example, genetic determinism may prevent an 
individual from obtaining mental health and understanding their “reciprocal 
relation with the world” (Malpas, 2012, p. 156) to achieve their homecoming to 
their place in the world and history, which “is one that is constantly before us, 
in which we are always situated, and yet from which we often seem estranged” 
(Ibid, p. 14). This is supported by a variety of research. For example, in 2017, 
Carver et.al state, 
“genetic determinism is thought to have a negative impact on people’s under-
standing of health and disease. Genetic deterministic views can, for example, 
lead people to devalue the role of environmental or experiential factors in a 
number of traits such as mental illness, cancer, obesity, diabetes, which in turn 
can hamper efforts to prevent diseases” (2017, p. 5). 
Furthermore, the aim of Beauchamp et.al (2011) was “to examine the effect 
of deterministic media reports, linking genetics to inactivity, in relation to inac-
tive people’s social cognitions concerning physical activity involvement” (Ibid, 
p. 8). These authors found a study that “provides insight into the potential del-
eterious effects of genetic deterministic reports” (Ibid, p. 9). In this cited study, 
“women were primed with either a genetic or an experiential account (i.e., a 
nature-versus-nurture explanation) for gender differences in mathematics abil-
ity. Specifically, when women were provided with a bogus report that innate 
genetic differences exist between males and females in terms of mathematics 
ability (i.e., women are born to be worse at mathematics), they subsequently 
performed worse on a mathematics test than when women were provided with 
an alternative experiential report” (Ibid). These results “raise a cautionary flag 
regarding the way in which genetics research is presented in the media” (Ibid, 
p. 8). More precisely in relation to place, genetic determinism can prevent or 
discourage “a return to our own experience of being, and one might say, our 
own experience of ourselves” (Malpas, 2012, p. 173). Place can remain uncon-
scious or ‘misrecognised’ (Gildersleeve, 2016a, p.8) if an individual does not 
follow the ethics of psychoanalysis to act in “conformity with the desire that is 
in you” (Lacan cited in Gildersleeve, 2017, p. 4) to unify their desire with the de-
sire of the Other through Jung’s transcendent function (Gildersleeve, 2018, p. 
27). The ambitions of Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis are to achieve this 
as “a turning or a coming back to place, or to a place, in a way that also brings 
that place itself into view. It is an occurrence that is mirrored in Heidegger’s 
own image of the “clearing” (Lichtung) that allows the emergence of things into 
presence” (Malpas, 2012, p. 19). Malpas states, this 
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“movement back to place-back to that which otherwise remains unnoticed and 
unremarked (as place itself often remains in the background of our activities)-
can also be understood as a movement of recollection, of remembering again, 
and Heidegger draws directly on this idea alongside that of return or homecom-
ing” (Ibid). 
This homecoming is in contrast to ‘not-being-at-home’, which occurs when 
an individual leaves their place undiscovered because their genetic determin-
ism beliefs prevent them from discovering their place (see Gildersleeve 2016a,b; 
2017). 
Adding to this, Carver et.al (2017, p. 4) argue genetic determinism “ignores 
the influence of environmental and epigenetic factors” and this is important 
because “genes show different expressivity and penetrance depending on the 
influence of environmental factor”. In other words, genetic determinism ig-
nores the “multiplicity of elements” (Malpas, 1999a, p. 133) of place, which 
determines the fate of an individual’s life, which are not exclusively genes. Our 
research is important to combat these misguided dogmas because “genetic de-
terministic beliefs still prevail to a great extent, according to the literature” and 
“Previous studies examining public knowledge of genetics generally indicate 
that such knowledge is low” (Carver et al., 2017, p. 4). Finally, the public has dif-
ficulty with “the notion that genetic and environmental factors interact” (Ibid). 
This is something our philosophy of place does not ignore because we believe 
“it is a mistake to look for simple, reductive accounts-whether we are exploring 
a concept, or problem, or the meaning of a term, the point is always to look to 
a larger field of relations in which the matter at issue can be placed” (Malpas, 
2008, p. 35). Genes are the basic functional units of our heredity. However, they 
do not determine our character2. Truly ‘knowing oneself ’ is not a mere func-
tion of the human genome. Rather, it is achieved through the ‘remembering of 
place’. Thus, place is, and will continue to be, central to virtuous character and 
human flourishing. 
Genetic Determinism and the Media
The philosophy of place is urgently needed to re-orientate common opin-
ion because “Genetics-related research often receives much attention from the 
media (Conrad, 2002; Nelkin & Lindee, 1995)” (Dar-Nimrod, Heine, 2011, p. 
811). Dar-Nimrod and Heine argue, this “research is simplified to the point that 
many readers or listeners may get a misunderstanding of the phenomenon” 
(Ibid), which we contend is because place is not included in the conception of 
genetics research. Conrad also “noted a number of biases in the ways genetic 
2 Of course genes play a role or factor in determining our character but our character is not so-
lely determined by genes. The effect of genes and character is ultimately determined by place. 
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findings are communicated that make the genes appear to play a more central 
and deterministic role than the data actually suggest” (Ibid). Dar-Nimrod and 
Heine claim, “such distortions in the way genetic research is communicated 
may have a variety of negative consequences” (Ibid, p. 813). For example, when 
an individual only understands their self/existence through their genetic make-
up, they are unable to understand the “interconnected and mutually defining” 
(Malpas, 1999a, p. 133) relationship between their genes and their place in 
the world and history. Likewise, “people who gain their knowledge of genetics 
largely through the media are likely to conceive of genetic influences in overly 
deterministic, immutable, and ultimately erroneous ways” (Dar-Nimrod, He-
ine, 2011, p. 812). This is mistaken because the effect of genetic makeup 
“is never a matter simply of the coming to presence of a single being-as if pres-
ence was something that could attach to a single self-sufficient entity. The pres-
encing or disclosedness of a being is always a matter of its coming to presence 
in relation to other beings” (Malpas, 2008, p. 14). 
This shows why it is problematic that “public discourse on genetics is plagued 
by genetic fatalism in such a way that any association between genes and be-
havior is seen to imply predetermined, immutable behaviour” (Dar-Nimrod, 
Heine, 2011, p. 803). Likewise, Carver et al. (2017, p. 4) show that “Studies of 
mass media portrayals of genetics also generally indicate a predominant dis-
course of determinism” and “public discourse on genetics is plagued by genetic 
determinism in such a way that human beings equate ‘all their social, histori-
cal, and moral complexity, with their genes’”. Clearly, genetic determinism is 
not a minor issue and this emphasizes the importance of correcting this by 
recognising that the effect of genes are determined through place which is “a 
gathering of elements that are themselves mutually defined only through the 
way in which they are gathered together within the place they also constitute” 
(Malpas, 2008, p. 29). 
Genetic determinism and the philosophy of place are mutually exclusive 
and place is ‘forgotten’ or unconscious if the public becomes “more accepting 
of the genetic determinist ideology” (Kirby, 2000, p. 197). This acceptance is 
evident when “popular images convey a striking picture of the gene as power-
ful, deterministic, and central to an understanding of both everyday behavior 
and the ‘secret of life’” (Ibid, p. 198). This acceptance of genetic determinism 
and forgetting of place is destructive because it leads to “strengthened fatalistic 
cognitions, a reduced belief in the importance of the environment in shaping 
human behavior, and a decrease in perceived individual choice” (Dar-Nimrod, 
Heine, 2001, p. 814). This is important because it highlights that an individ-
ual will only be ‘at home in the world’ (without complexes see Gildersleeve, 
Crowden, 2018) if they do not reduce themselves to their genes and by finding 
their place in the world which is interconnected with others. This is not helped 
when examples of genetic determinism in the media are highly prevalent:
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“In 2002, for example, news headlines claimed, ‘Quest for Alcohol Gene Sets 
Monkeys on Binge’ (Harrison, 2002). That same year, news reported, ‘Fear Gene 
Could Unlock Mental Illness’ (BBC News, 2002). In 2003, CBS News reported 
a story about ‘the heart attack gene’ isolated in one family among generations 
of members who have experienced heart disease; the report asserted that, ‘the 
gene doesn’t merely increase their risk of a heart attack. It’s an absolute guar-
antee’ (Leung, 2003). In 2007, a New York Times article was titled, ‘Scientists 
Identify 7 New Diabetes Genes’ (Wade, 2007)” (Parrott, Kahl, Ndiaye, Traeder, 
2012, p. 764). 
This forgetting of place leads to inauthentic and misleading reporting in the 
media because “there are no ‘disease genes,’ but rather genes that increase risk 
for disease” (Ibid). A more authentic and Real (Gildersleeve, 2016a; 2017) report 
would “state that genes linked to such chronic conditions as heart disease do 
not set an absolute life course in determining health” (Parrott, Kahl, Ndiaye, 
Traeder, 2012, p. 775) because we exist in a world where “we find ourselves 
along with other persons and things” (Malpas, 2008, p. 221). When this is ig-
nored, an individual’s belief in genetic determinism may be “directly related to 
fatalism (Shen et al., 2009), which contributes to failure to seek health care and 
perceptions of lack of control over health” (Ibid). This means place needs to be 
promoted, endorsed and 
“genetic researchers should emphasize the importance of avoiding the use of 
shorthand expressions such as ‘a heart attack gene’ instead of ‘Gene defect ex-
plains high blood pressure’ (BBC News, 2003) and ‘Single gene link to heart 
health’ (BBC News, 2004)” (Smerecnik, 2010, p. 386). 
When the media ignores place and presents genetics to the public in this 
way, it brings “several authors to argue that media coverage of genetics may 
lead to beliefs of genetic determinism (De Vries, Mesters, Van de Steeg & Hon-
ing, 2005; Katz Rothman, 1998)” (Ibid). Dar-Nimrod and Heine summarise this 
by stating, “media coverage of genetics may thus have adverse effects on public 
health” (e.g. the formation of a complex) when headlines such as “DNA is the 
‘secret of life’” (Dar-Nimrod, Heine, 2011, p. 811) are flaunted to the public. 
The fantasy of genetic determinism grows greater when “In television shows, 
in advertisements, in documentaries, and even in novels, we are told that DNA 
makes us what we are both physically, mentally, and behaviorally (see Keller, 
1992; Nelkin and Lindee, 1995)” (Gilbert, 2002, p. 123). This reporting is coun-
terproductive because an individual will only be psychologically ‘at home in 
the world’ (Gildersleeve, Crowden, 2018) if they are able to discover their place, 
which is mutually, defined in relation to others. Unfortunately, “Genetic deter-
minism is becoming an assumption of modern life” (Gilbert, 2002, p. 123). Our 
philosophy of place is an important correction to this. 
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Genetic Determinism and Education
In this next section we ask, 
“Is there a way that these biases might be reduced? Can people be led to ap-
preciate how genetic accounts of an outcome do not necessarily mean that the 
outcome is immutable, homogeneous, and natural or has a specific etiology?” 
(Dar-Nimrod, Heine, 2011, p. 802)3. 
Dar-Nimrod and Heine say, “suggestions for interventions are speculative, 
and researchers would contribute to the field by exploring some of them” (Ibid, 
p. 813); we take up this challenge here. This is important because as Carver et 
al. (2017, p. 2) highlight
“studies within genetics education and public understanding of genetics per-
sistently show that the public and, more specifically students, have rather low 
knowledge of genetics. Genetic deterministic views about the nature of genes, 
behavior and biological traits have been found among students, teachers, text-
books, and the public”. 
Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011, p. 813) suggest, “One strategy to undermine 
genetic determinism would be to call people’s attention to the interactive rela-
tionships between genes and the environment”. An example of achieving this 
is to integrate place into discussion of genetics. This type of education could 
reduce discrimination; for example 
“Walker and Read (2002) found that people had more positive evaluations of 
schizophrenia when they encountered a gene–environment interaction expla-
nation than when they encountered an exclusively genetic account” (Ibid). 
Dar-Nimrod and Heine also argue 
“People rarely appreciate that the expressions of genes are probabilistic and 
governed by experiences and interactions with other genes, nor do they gener-
ally consider how genes can influence the ways we interact with and are thus 
shaped by our environments” (Ibid). 
This shows the errors of education on genetics when it excludes an indi-
vidual’s relationship to others by focusing solely on the genetic makeup of the 
individual as “separate and autonomous entities” (Malpas, 2011, p.49). New 
forms of genetics education need to incorporate a recognition “that we can-
not understand ourselves independently of the places in which our lives unfold 
even though those places may be complex and multiple” (Malpas, 2014a, p. 22). 
Incorporating place into genetics education is supported by evidence “that 
increased education in general is sometimes associated with a reduction in 
3 Here it is important to note that we are not saying genetic heritage is passive in a sense that is 
not present at all. We are giving the benefit to say that the gene will express itself but the effect 
that gene has on a person’s life is determined by place not the genes alone. 
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belief in genetic determinism (Singer et al., 2007)” (Dar-Nimrod, Heine, 2011, 
p. 804). We argue that education programs that incorporate the philosophy of 
place into discussions of genes can remove the beliefs and fantasies of genetic 
determinism. We propose including a philosophy of place in “the manner in 
which genetics is taught in the classroom (e.g., Dougherty, 2009) may go a long 
way toward a solution” (Ibid, p. 813). This is vital because “Genetics education 
has, for example, been suspected of indoctrinating strong genetic determin-
ism” (Aivelo, Uitto, 2015, p. 139). This is supported by a study that investigated 
“how the current curriculum manifests in Finnish biology textbooks” (Ibid). 
These authors found the “textbooks expressed sometimes even strong genetic 
determinism” where “the parlance of genes ‘determining’ a trait and the genes 
having a superior role over environment were common throughout the books” 
(Ibid, p. 148). In response to this, the authors “argue that genetics education 
needs to take more into account than environmental effects” (Ibid, p. 139). This 
aligns perfectly to our philosophy of place, which is based on “identity through 
differentiation” (Malpas, 2016, p.7). In other words, the identity of genes is 
determined (negatively e.g. what it is not) through differences to the environ-
ment and to other individuals. This is how to understand ‘the whole organism’ 
outside of reductive and solipsistic genetic determinism. In other words, “while 
one can take the thing at issue at a certain ‘instant’ and then analyze or dissect 
it into its apparently separate elements, treating each as if it had an identity 
of its own, any such analysis is always somewhat artificial” (Malpas, 2008, p. 
59). This type of education is required because “Genetic determinism, making 
genes central to biology, is biased and misguided. The crucial unit must be the 
whole organism” (Midgley, 1999, p. 900). One way to achieve this is through 
place which allows “re-conceptualizing notions like ‘genes’ and ‘nature’ [which] 
will probably be one of the most effective ways to help students and the gen-
eral public [to] abandon genetic determinism” (Moore, 2008, p. 344). Evidence 
that this is required is found where “biologists continue to write as if develop-
mental processes can be genetically determined (e.g., Gehring, 1998)” (Ibid, 
p. 332) coupled with “belief that genes can determine the form of some of our 
characteristics remains widely held by journalists, politicians, students, and 
the general public—and surprisingly, by many social scientists” (Ibid, p. 333). 
In contrast, our philosophy of place argues that genes need to be understood 
“within a dense web of relations – through those relations it gives shape and 
focus to other things, but in doing so it also gives shape and focus to itself” 
(Malpas, 2016, p. 8). Moore suggests 
“genetic determinism might retain some currency because of the apparent el-
egance of its simplicity; the emerging understanding of how genes interact with 
nongenetic factors during development is extremely complex, and so perhaps 
less appealing to these individuals” (Moore, 2008, p. 334). 
He highlights 
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“although many philosophers and scientists consider simpler theories to be 
preferable to more complex theories, all other things being equal (Sober, 1981), 
a truly complex reality requires a complex theory, even if such a theory might 
initially be less appealing to those exposed to it” (Ibid, p. 343). 
Moore adds, “Unfortunately, it is not yet clear how we might best attempt to 
convey the essential interdependence of nature and nurture to students and the 
general public” (Ibid) but we contend that our philosophy of place can convey 
this interdependence. For example, the effect of genes is determined through 
the environment, others and “through the interrelating of the elements that 
already belong to the situation” (Malpas, 2008, p. 59). In other words, the effect 
of genes on an individual is not determined by genes alone but through “the 
reciprocal determination of elements” (Ibid) (genes, others, environment). The 
effect of genes are determined through 
“a structure that is constituted through the mutual interplay of multiple ele-
ments, a structure that encompasses the entities and elements that appear 
within it rather than underlying them, a structure to which belongs a unity that 
is given only in and through the mutual relatedness of the elements that make 
it up” (Malpas, 2012, p. 40). 
In the article, “Hybrid Deterministic Views About Genes in Biology Text-
books: A Key Problem in Genetics Teaching” (dos Santos, Joaquim, El-Hani, 
2012), the authors “analyzed 18 textbooks using categorical content analysis”. 
They found the textbooks “reinforce genetic deterministic discourses and may 
lead students to serious misunderstandings about the nature of genes and their 
role in living systems, with consequences to future learning about genetics” 
(Ibid, p. 572). This is supported by Carver et al. (2017, p. 5) who found 
“Studies on how genetics is taught in schools generally indicate that the pre-
dominant mode of genetics instruction, as well as the content of genetics text-
books, prime students to think deterministically”. 
The significance of our philosophy of place to correct this is also noted when 
“It has been also shown that when students learn or talk about molecular ge-
netics they tend to draw on more deterministic Mendelian explanations. In 
particular, according to Dougherty, ‘many students view phenotypes through 
the lens of Mendelian inheritance and fail to appreciate that most human traits 
are the product of polygenic expression modulated by the environment’” (Ibid). 
If the philosophy of place is not included in discussion of genetics “bio-
ethicists might inadvertently be promoting genetic determinism: the idea that 
genes alone determine human traits and behaviours” (de Melo-Martin, 2004, 
p. 526). As a result,
“because of the problematic implications that the ideology of genetic determin-
ism might have for individuals’ wellbeing and for our public policies, bioethi-
cists should be careful to present these issues in ways that do not promote ques-
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tionable ideas about the causal role of genes in human diseases and behaviours” 
(Ibid). 
An individual’s wellbeing is affected by genetic determinism because the 
obstructiveness of a complex is experienced when place is foreclosed from sym-
bolic reality (Gildersleeve, 2016a,b; 2017). In contrast, an individual’s authentic 
identity and place in the world “is given only in and through the ongoing and 
reciprocal determination of the elements of which it is constituted” (Malpas, 
2008, p. 60) and when this is ignored through a belief in genetic determin-
ism, the individual misrecognises their place in the world, which results in the 
experience ‘not-being-at-home-in-the-world’. An example of this psychopatho-
logical fantasy of genetic determinism comes from “the flood of arguments 
against human cloning on grounds of a possible loss of a sense of individuality 
or unique identity promote the incorrect belief that our genes determine hu-
man individuality or identity” (de Melo-Martin, 2004, p. 526). However, this 
argument is misguided because individuality and unique identity are not only 
determined by genes but also through place, which is “a gathered unity in which 
things find themselves brought together with one another while they are also 
disclosed in their difference” (Malpas, 2008, p.264). Furthermore, 
“many of the debates about the rightness or wrongness of genetic enhance-
ment, erroneously suggest that tinkering with the human genome is sufficient 
to ‘enhance’ our memory, intelligence, disease resistance, or beauty” (de Melo-
Martin, 2004, p. 526). 
However, these types of arguments are unsound because genes alone do 
not determine these characteristics, place must also be considered because the 
effect of genes are “defined not by their positive content but negatively by their 
relations with the other terms of the system. Their most precise characteristic 
is in being what the others are not” (Saussure, 1959, p. 117). This then shows 
a mistake when “bioethicists present genetic tests as being more predictive of 
human diseases than what is actually reasonable” (de Melo-Martin, 2004, p. 
526). In contrast, our philosophy of place rejects “the idea that genes alone play 
a role in the development of human traits and behaviours” (Ibid). The ideas we 
provide to this area of study is vital because endorsing genetic determinism 
“can contribute to public policies that emphasise genetic interventions rather 
than preventive measures, lifestyle modifications, or transformations of social 
structures. If, however, factors other than our genes influence the development 
of—for example, human diseases—then focusing on genetic interventions alone 
will be inefficient” (Ibid, p. 527). 
When the philosophy of place is forgotten, 
“the belief that genes determine us might result in people seeing information 
about their genetic makeup as fate. Thus, although lifestyle changes could im-
prove people’s wellbeing, the motivation to do so might be lacking” (Ibid). 
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As a result, 
“bioethicists should be careful to present these and other similar issues in ways 
that do not promote problematic ideas about the deterministic role of genes in 
human development, diseases, and behaviours” (Ibid, p. 529).
Genetic Determinism and Discrimination
Our philosophy of place, which aims to dislodge genetic determinism’s (GD) 
acceptance, is important because a number of authors argue that GD is linked 
to discriminating behaviour. For example, Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011, p.803) 
say, 
“the Belief in Genetic Determinism Scale, which includes items such as ‘The 
fate of each person lies in his or her genes,’ positively correlates with prejudice, 
negative racial stereotyping, nationalism, and patriotism (Keller, 2005)”. 
Other researchers support this when they write, “Substantial empirical 
research has now demonstrated that genetic determinism is in fact linked to 
discriminatory attitudes including prejudice, Social Dominance Orientation, 
sexism, and racism” (Condit, 2011, p. 618). Furthermore, Kowal and Frederic 
(2012, p. 3) argue, “the way the media reports on genetic research is likely to 
increase belief in genetic determinism”. This is also supported 
“by several studies that have found significant correlations between the belief 
in genetic determinism (of human traits and behaviour) and levels of prejudice, 
including racism. Dambrun et al found group prejudice, including racism, to be 
mediated by belief in genetic determinism, to the effect that the more people 
believed in the power of environmental determinants of behaviour and person-
ality, the lower the level of racism” (Ibid). 
Furthermore 
“belief in genetic determinism was significantly correlated with prejudice, in-
cluding negative racial stereotyping, the study also found that rendering geneti-
cally essentialist information salient (i.e. ‘priming’) clearly increased levels of 
prejudice and in-group bias” (Ibid, p. 4). 
In other words, “people who are especially likely to view groups as sharing 
a common genetic essence are more likely to espouse stereotypic beliefs about 
those groups” (Dar-Nimrod, Heine, 2011, p. 803). This shows that belief in ge-
netic determinism and the forgetting of place “is a societal problem because 
it has the potential to foster intolerant attitudes such as racism and prejudice 
against sexual orientation” (Gericke et al., 2017, p. 1223). However, “knowledge 
about genetics and the influence of the environment on biological outcomes 
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might reduce beliefs in genetic determinism” (Ibid, p. 1224). An idea that is 
entirely congruent with our philosophy of place.
GATTACA and Place
The film GATTACA provides a cinematic demonstration that genetic deter-
minism leads to discrimination and mental illness and therefore supports our 
aims in this paper. In the year 2000, Kirby writes, “GATTACA (1997) presents 
a unique counter-argument” (p. 198) to genetic determinism. Kirby argues, 
“GATTACA tries to break out of the black box constructed by genetic scientists 
who portray a world dominated by genes. GATTACA does not deny the impor-
tance of genes, nor does it fault the technology itself; rather, the film warns of 
the problems that arise if we believe that humans are nothing more than their 
genes” (Ibid). Kirby gives an excellent outline of the film:
“GATTACA depicts a future world in which parents are encouraged to decide 
the genetic makeup of their offspring before birth. In this world not everyone 
has access to the technology, and individuals who have not been genetically 
enhanced encounter severe discrimination. GATTACA’s narrative focuses on 
Vincent Freeman, a genetically unenhanced individual, and his interactions 
with three characters, Eugene, Irene, and Anton, who are genetically enhanced. 
During the course of the film, Vincent avoids genetic discrimination by passing 
off Eugene Morrow’s genetic makeup as his own. Because everyone believes that 
Vincent has Eugene’s genetic profile, he is able to obtain a job at the prestigious 
Gattaca corporation, which arranges offworld expeditions. While at Gattaca, 
Vincent develops a romantic relationship with Irene, who would be genetically 
perfect except for a single flaw, a weak heart-ironically, the same defect suffered 
by Vincent himself. Early in the film an executive is murdered at Gattaca, and 
the subsequent investigation is conducted by Vincent’s genetically augmented 
younger brother, Anton. A stray eyelash provides DNA evidence, making Vin-
cent the prime suspect in the murder. Because the DNA profile from the eye-
lash shows a genetically imperfect individual, nobody suspects that the eyelash 
really belongs to the best engineer working at Gattaca. As Irene and Anton 
begin to realize that Vincent is not genetically perfect, they are forced, along 
with Eugene, to confront the fact that the genetically unenhanced Vincent is 
actually a superior human being, able to excel physically and socially despite his 
built-in ‘flaws’” (Ibid, p. 199).
GATTACA is “an extrapolative science fiction film” (Ibid) that portrays a 
world dominated by the ideology of genetic determinism and where place is 
foreclosed and undiscovered. Kirby argues, “the filmmakers act as bioethicists, 
attempting to forecast the consequences of unrestricted human-gene therapy 
in a society that accepts all the implications of the genetic determinist ideol-
ogy” (Ibid). He shows that: 
Matthew Gildersleeve, Andrew Crowden, Genetic Determinism and Place154
“In the Production Notes for GATTACA, co producer Stacey Sher points out 
that ‘GATTACA is a science fiction thriller about how we might come to live 
with the scientific powers we are currently discovering...; [it] creates a complete 
and believable world of the future based on the genetic testing that is becom-
ing a reality today’ (1). Screenwriter/director Andrew Niccol’s construction of 
GATTACA as a bioethical text focuses on three prominent concerns: 1) genetic 
discrimination against those who are not enhanced, 2) the cultural implications 
of predictive genetics (genetic prophecy), and 3) the eradication of ‘undesirable’ 
traits and human imperfections” (Ibid). 
Kirby highlights that in GATTACA, 
“Discrimination against the genetically unenhanced presupposes that genetic 
determinism is the true state of the world and that genetic manipulation actu-
ally improves an enhanced individual’s behavior and ability to perform a job; 
in this case, the genetically enhanced should always perform better than the 
genetically unenhanced and genetic discrimination is justified” (Ibid, p. 201). 
The movie GATTACA is vitally important to this discussion because 
“If genetic determinism is not a valid paradigm, then genetic manipulation 
will not automatically improve an enhanced individual’s behaviour” and “the 
genetically unenhanced should be able to perform as well as, or better than, 
genetically-enhanced individuals, and genetic discrimination is not justified” 
(Ibid, p. 202). 
This paves the way to show that the philosophy of place is a better predictor 
of destiny, represented when “the genetically-unenhanced Vincent proves to be 
more successful than all the genetically-enhanced characters” (Ibid). This is how 
combining place and “GATTACA dismisses the practice of genetic discrimina-
tion by rejecting its underlying assumption of genetic determinism” (Ibid).
Our philosophy of place denies “that a genetic readout can be used to predict 
a person’s future: genetic inheritance is equivalent to predestination” (Ibid). 
Harsanyi and Hutton mistakenly support these claims of genetic prophecy 
when they argue “that individuals’ genetic readouts are an accurate gauge of 
their future: ‘Genetics offers answers. For genes can foretell the future’” (Ibid). 
These authors display ‘genetic optimism’; “it is only a matter of time and techni-
cal skill before we understand their language” (Ibid). This is a problem because 
it ignores that genes interact with place and therefore genetic readout is not 
possible because place, which is “an interconnection can never be given all at 
once, nor in any final or exhaustive fashion (no mapping is ever complete)” 
(Malpas, 2014b, p. 4). Unfortunately, Harsanyi and Hutton ignore something 
that our philosophy of place does not: “a person ultimately develops this trait or 
disorder is dependent on complex interactions linking heredity, environment, 
the individual, and society” (Kirby, 2000, p. 202). Our philosophy of place ex-
plains and conceptualises why a “genetic readout provides uncertain predictive 
information about possible futures, not guaranteed outcomes” (Ibid) because 
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the effect of genes depends on a “repeated tracing out of those connections” 
(Malpas, 2014b, p. 4) of place. Kirby notes the “danger in believing that ge-
netic readouts are infallible is that these predictions will become self-fulfilling 
prophecies” (Kirby, 2000, p. 202) and this will lead an individual to not discover 
their authentic place in the world and history (resulting in psychological issues) 
(Gildersleeve, Crowden, 2018). Kirby supports this by referring to the work of 
sociologist Charlie Davison who argues, 
“a person who knows that he or she has a genetic predisposition for heart 
disease will behave as if certain to develop heart disease, rather than take the 
chance that the disease may never develop. In an extreme genetic-determinist 
society (i.e., GATTACA), genetic readouts would no longer serve as tentative 
predictors of possible futures, but would be viewed as unalterable prophecies” 
(Ibid, p. 203). 
The problems of genetic determinism are clear to see. When an individual 
is unaware of place they do not understand that their genes are “not given in-
dependently of other places-for there to be one place is for there to be many 
places, and so places appear always as part of a larger topographic or topologi-
cal field” (Malpas, 2014b, p. 8). With place included in the picture, it is clear 
that a genetic readout does not provide ‘unalterable prophecies’ because the 
effect of genes depends on an individual’s interaction with their place which “is 
essentially unitary, dynamic, and constantly unfolding” (Malpas, 2008, p. 65). 
GATTACA represents a world that has forgotten place, reflected in the 
story of Vincent who is “given his life story at the time of his birth based on his 
genetic readout: ‘My destiny was mapped out before me-all my flaws, predis-
positions, and susceptibilities’” (Kirby, 2000, p. 203). When place is forgotten 
“Vincent initially accepts this destiny, saying that ‘from an early age I came to 
think of myself as others thought of me-a chronic in-valid’” (Ibid). However, 
we argue that the truth of place allows Vincent to realise “that his potential 
is not written in his genes, and he escapes the trap of genetic determinism, 
becoming, as his name implies, a ‘Freeman’” (Ibid). Therefore, place frees the 
human being from the shackles and ideology of genetic determinism. This is 
possible because potential is not written exclusively in genes but is determined 
through place, which is “interconnection rather than their reduction, through 
their interdependence rather than their simplification” (Malpas, 1999b, p. 40). 
The character Irene also breaks from the brainwashing of genetic determin-
ism “As Uma Thurman, who plays Irene, states, ‘her fate isn’t sealed the way 
she thinks it is, and the realization transforms her’” (Kirby, 2000, p. 203). A 
world where genetic determinism is believed and place is left undiscovered is 
disastrous because “the genetically enhanced suffer under a burden, that of 
perfection” (Ibid). This is actually pathological because perfection is a fantasy 
and this ideology will only cause an individual to feel not-at-home-in-the-world 
because imperfection is necessary to discover their authentic and Real home 
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in the world through the Lacanian barred subject $ (Gildersleeve, 2016; 2017; 
2018). Imperfection is where an individual meets their boundaries or limits and 
this is essential to discover their place in the world (Ibid). As a result, genetic 
determinism may inadvertently prevent this by emphasizing the importance 
of genetic perfection. In contrast, our philosophy of place recognises that 
“boundary, in the Greek sense, does not block off but, rather, as itself some-
thing brought forth, first brings what is present to radiance” and “a boundary is 
not that at which something stops but (…) that from which something begins 
its presencing” (Malpas, 2012, p. 101). This boundedness is the structure of the 
Self or barred subject (which Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalytic treatment 
aim to uncover) and this is what allows an individual to remove the obstruc-
tiveness of their complex to find their place, freedom (Gildersleeve, 2017, p. 7-8) 
and homecoming in the world.
Place implicitly challenges genetic determinism throughout GATTACA. 
For example, “Vincent’s actions cause Anton to question his innate superiority. 
When Vincent saves Anton from drowning, Vincent realizes that ‘My brother 
was not as strong as he believed and I was not as weak’” (Kirby, 2000 p. 204). 
This example illustrates that the place or situation determined Vincent sav-
ing Anton from drowning, not only his genes. Genetic determinism is again 
challenged by place because “Throughout the film we are reminded that Eu-
gene has a genetic makeup second to none. He has been engineered to be an 
Olympic swimmer, yet he has only won a silver medal at the games” (Ibid). Our 
philosophy of place can explain why this is so. One example is that swimming 
performance is determined by the place of Eugene’s genes in relation to the 
ability of other swimmer’s in the race. 
Kirby also notes, “visual motifs express the overriding importance of genetic 
makeup in GATTACA’s society” (Ibid, p. 205). This example shows place (is ex-
cluded) has no place in this genetic determinism society. GATTACA further 
emphasizes the characters are absorbed by genetic determinism instead of 
place when “Blood, skin, hair (including eyelashes), urine, and fingernails are 
all shown in extreme close-up” (Ibid, p. 206). Kirby explains the “use of such 
shots in GATTACA is meant to show how GATTACA’s society magnifies the 
importance of genetic material, the smallest element of a human being” (Ibid). 
Kirby rightly notes, “these extreme close-ups of body parts and waste matter are 
extremely alienating, suggesting that human beings are valued less than their 
cast-off DNA” (Ibid) and highlights the human beings alienation from place. 
Our philosophy of place combined with GATTACA’s critique of genetic de-
terminism is very important. This is evident when examined alongside 
“One of the most well-known scientists in the field of human genetics, Dean 
Hamer, [who] claims in his 1998 book Living With Our Genes that everyone’s 
‘core personality’ is ‘hardwired into their bodies since birth, a genetic legacy 
from their parents as surely as the color of their eyes’” (Kirby, 2000, p. 210). 
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Again, GATTACA and place are vital here to combat the genetic determin-
ism of Hamer who 
“claims that environmental factors such as ‘rearing, education, or social sta-
tus’ contribute almost nothing toward determining an individual’s personality. 
Hamer is not some rogue figure; he is Chief of Gene Structure and Regulation at 
the National Cancer Institute’s Laboratory of Biochemistry, and he is not alone 
among biologists in his acceptance of genetic determinism. James Watson, co-
discoverer of the structure of DNA and Director of the Cold Spring Harbor 
Laboratory, has asserted that ‘we used to think our fate was in our stars. Now 
we know, in large measure, our fate is in our genes’” (Ibid)
Here it is important to note that the acceptance of place may be thwarted 
(as well as achieving mental health) if “the human genetics community has an 
interest in gaining societal acceptance of genetic determinism, whether that 
interest be financial, political, or professional (e.g., career advancement)” (Ibid). 
Genetic determinism may be motivated and place fraudulently demotivated 
through “a need to convince the federal government to maintain funding for 
human-genetics research, such as the Human Genome Project” and “designed 
to keep public attention focused on the great potential benefits that are likely 
to flow from the Human Genome Project” (Ibid). 
Finally, Kirby sums up the philosophical significance of GATTACA by stat-
ing it “is not only unique among bioethics texts; it is virtually alone among 
recent popular culture narratives in its rejection of the genetic-determinist ide-
ology” (Ibid, p. 212). Our philosophy of place combined with GATTACA does 
not fault genetic “technology itself, but rather questions societal acceptance of 
an ideology that holds that humans are nothing more than the sum of their 
genes (genetic determinism)” (Ibid, p. 215). GATTACA depicts a future where 
“genetic determinism becomes a closed ‘black box’ once it is taken for granted 
and accepted as accurate and useful” (Ibid). GATTACA is an important film 
to consider in debates on genetic determinism combined with our philosophy 
of place “to break open the black box that has been constructed by scientists 
who portray a world dominated by genes” (Ibid). We hope that when this black 
box is broken open it will be commonly accepted that genes are not “sufficient 
to gain a view of the entire region; multiple sightings are required, and every 
sighting overlaps, to some extent, with some other sighting” (Malpas, 1999b, p. 
41). If this black box is not broken, the reality and truth of place will continue to 
haunt supporters of genetic determinism as ‘the return of the repressed’ (Gild-
ersleeve, 2018, p. 12). This is reinforced by Malpas who argues “We may become 
estranged from place, we may forget or cover over our essential placedness, but 
these are all forms of concealing, disguising, or denying a relatedness to place 
that nevertheless perdures” (Malpas, 2012, p. 63). It is important to highlight 
this because in our reductionist scientific “modernity, our relatedness to place 
is not obliterated, but is rather covered over, ignored, made invisible” (Ibid).
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Genetic Modification and Place
In this penultimate section, we elucidate an important article by Resnik and 
Vorhaus (2006). They argue, 
“popular culture, the media, and politicians are apt to ignore the fact that strong 
genetic determinism is almost entirely a myth. Journalists continue to speak of 
‘genes for obesity,’ ‘genes for alcoholism,’ and ‘cancer genes,’ as if genes exist 
that, once discovered, will give individuals the ability to simply ‘shut off’ obe-
sity, alcoholism, or cancer with a few simple snips to their genome” (2006, p. 4). 
In their article ‘Genetic modification and genetic determinism’, these au-
thors “examine four objections to the genetic modification of human beings: 
the freedom argument, the giftedness argument, the authenticity argument, 
and the uniqueness argument” (Ibid, p. 1). Briefly stated, the freedom argument, 
“claims that genetic modification interferes with the ability of the modified 
human being to make free choices” (Ibid, p. 5), the giftedness argument states 
“parents and others supporting genetic modification are accused of desiring 
to ‘play God’, and of designing children to fulfill their own desires” (Ibid, p. 8). 
The authenticity argument “claims that the person who benefits from a genetic 
modification plays no significant role in the development of the desired trait” 
(Ibid). Finally, the uniqueness argument claims, “cloning would inherently in-
terfere with the individuality of the cloned person and therefore undermine the 
formation of his or her personal identity” (Ibid, p. 9). Resnik and Vorhaus show 
“these arguments against genetic modification assumes a strong version of ge-
netic determinism. Since these strong deterministic assumptions are false, the 
arguments against genetic modification, which assume and depend upon these 
assumptions, are therefore unsound” (Ibid, p. 1). 
We combine our philosophy of place with this work from Resnik and 
Vorhaus to add further support to dismiss these arguments against genetic 
modification, which can bring about a “changed conception of both our usual 
ways of thinking about philosophy, about ourselves, and about our own experi-
ence of involvement in the world” (Malpas, 2012, p. 4). As a result, our work on 
place supports the claim that 
“Serious discussion of the morality of genetic modification, and the develop-
ment of sound science policy, should be driven by arguments that address the 
actual consequences of genetic modification for individuals and society, not 
by ones propped up by false or misleading biological assumptions” (Resnik, 
Vorhaus, 2006, p. 1) 
(genetic determinism). Our philosophy of place shows these arguments against 
genetic modification fail because they assume genetic determinism and do not 
consider place. In other words, these four arguments against genetic modifica-
tion fail to note that the effect of genes is 
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“never a matter simply of the coming to presence of a single being-as if presence 
was something that could attach to a single self-sufficient entity. The presencing 
or disclosedness of a being is always a matter of its coming to presence in rela-
tion to other beings” (Malpas, 2008, p. 14). 
One factor that Resnik and Vorhaus use to support genetic modification, 
which they define as “the process of intentionally altering human genes for the 
purpose of producing offspring with those genetic changes”, is that “most of the 
causal claims related to genetic determinism are probabilistic, not determin-
istic” (Resnik, Vorhaus, 2006, p. 2). We support this by contending that place 
breaks any deterministic effects of genes and changes this into probabilistic 
effects, which are dependent on “an essential mutuality of relation at every 
level” (Malpas, 2012, p. 4) between genes, the environment and others. This is 
substantiated by Resnik and Vorhaus who add 
“The complex interaction and interdependence of genes and environments, a 
fundamental and frequently ignored reality of biology, undermines the notion 
that genotypes alone determine (or cause) phenotypes” (Resnik, Vorhaus, 2006, 
p. 4). 
Conclusion
This article is an essential addition to the literature. Our investigation cen-
tred on genetic determinism and place and shows something which has not 
been considered before now. Specifically, our philosophy of place shows the 
potentially dangerous implications of genetic determinism. Fundamentally, 
genetic determinism promotes mental illness through the formation of ob-
structive complexes because it leads an individual to be estranged from their 
authentic place to feel at home in the world. Our future research aims to verify 
this empirically. Our article highlights the media and educational programs 
play an important role in this formation of complexes. Our article summarises 
research that shows that the forgetting of place that leads to genetic determin-
ism is associated with many forms of discrimination. The film GATTACA was 
a useful platform to depict a world, which shows the absurdity of genetic de-
terminism, but to highlight also, why our philosophy of place is an important 
resource to remove this ideology from common acceptance. Finally, our work 
has significant implications for debates on genetic modification. We conclude 
that many arguments against genetic modification (the freedom, giftedness, 
authenticity and uniqueness arguments) assume genetic determinism and do 
not consider place in their discussion. Because of this, we support the endeav-
ours of genetic modification because the assumptions and scare tactics used by 
supporters of genetic determinism that oppose genetic modification are not as 
Real or authentic as they suggest.
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Genetički determinizam i mjesto 
Sažetak
U ovom tekstu smo pregledno opisali fenomen genetičkog determinizma i po-
jasnili na koji način naše ranije istraživanje posvećeno filozofiji mjesta može 
doprinijeti boljem razumijevanju genomike te pratećih debata u svezi s umjet-
nom genetičkom preinakom. Pokazali smo kako mjesto može potkopati bilo 
koju filozofiju genetičkog determinizma. Primjenom naše filozofije mjesta, ovo 
istraživanje doprinosi pozivu da se čovječanstvo okrene prema »kolektivnom 
biti-doma-u-svijetu« umjesto što se otuđuje od mjesta što genetički determi-
nizam aktivno promiče. Također, ovdje se koristimo filmologijom kako bismo 
pokazali da film GATTACA konceptualizira da su mjesto i genetički deter-
minizam suprotstavljeni. Naše istraživanje doprinosi aktualnim raspravama 
fokusiranim na genetički determinizam onako kako se odvijaju u medijima, 
obrazovanju te onako kako utječu na diskriminaciju. U osnovi, ovdje pokazu-
jemo zašto bi umnici iz ovog područja u svojim budućim istraživanjima trebali 
razmatrati mjesto usporedno s genetičkim determinizmom.
Ključne riječi: genetički determinizam, psihoanaliza, etika, mjesto.
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